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The present study is intended to scholarly explore auditors’
perceptions regarding joint audits; whether it can improve audit
quality. To reach this goal, participants were enrolled from Big 4,
non-Big 4, and other stockholders. In addition, the present study
examines the perception of the same stakeholders in terms of
how audit concentration affects the audit market in the UAE.
Being a qualitative study, 12 semi-structured interviews were
conducted to collect required data; 4 face to face and 8 through
using Google forms. The finding of the study revealed mixed
perception regarding joint audits; it may improve audit quality at
the cost of high fees and free-rider problems. Findings of the
study has practical implication for policymakers of emerging
economies around the globe, such as policymakers who can make
joint audits as compulsory. Another significance of the present
work is that it has allowed for the perception of stakeholders,
who are at the center of the controversial subject of joint audits
and audit market concentration. The study suggests that there is
a need for removing language barriers; it will benefit some firms
in the form of directly communicating with auditors either in
English or in Urdu.
Keywords: Joint Audits, Audit Quality, Audit Market Concentration,
Implications, Perceptions
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regaining public trust in auditor independence (Zerni
et. al., 2012; Haak, Muraz, & Zieseniß, 2018). Among
other actions, the paper proposed joint audits as a
mechanism for enhancement audit quality (Holm &
Thinggaard, 2014; Andre, Broye, Pong, & Schatt,
2016). However, the proposal for joint audits was

1. INTRODUCTION
In proper response to the financial crises, the
European Commission (EC), in October 2010 issued a
Green Paper on Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis,
the paper proposed number of regulatory actions for
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withdrawn consequent to the number of claims that
there is not enough evidence that audit policy would
lead to better audit quality arguing that instead joint
audits are likely to increase both audit fees and
complexity (Andre et al., 2016).
The concept of joint audits has its roots back
into 1930, wherein Denmark’s joint audit was a
compulsory requirement both for listed and stateowned enterprises (Ratzinger-Sakel, AudoussetCoulier, Kettunen, & Lesage, 2013) with the similar
policy adopted in France since 1966 for public
companies (Deng, Lu, Simunic, & Ye, 2014).
A joint audit mechanism is adopted for
overcoming the market domination by Big 4, which
according to EC reports, harms the audit market.
Similarly, the practice of the "four-eye" mechanism is
considered as a substitute audit reform to reduce
audit market concentration and ultimately enhance
audit quality (Velte & Azibi, 2015). Big 4 firms
account for 94% of audit firms for listed companies
in Member States of Europe (European Commission,
2011; Guo, Koch, & Zhu, 2017). This high
concentration ratio attracted the concern of EC; the
collapse of Big 4 firms will severely affect the audit
market (European Commission, 2010). However,
according to Holm and Thinggaard (2014), the EC
proposed mechanism of the joint audit was not well
received and it has been met with a "fierce
opposition"; opponents to this policy based their
argument that joint audits will increase audit cost
and bureaucracy.
Considering the above, this paper explores the
perceptions of auditors and stakeholders regarding
joint audits; whether joint audits could improve
audit quality and can reduce market concentration.
A critical review of the relevant literature exposes
that very insignificant work has been carried out
regarding Big 4 in terms of market concentration.
Similarly, the subject matter of joint audit has not
been given much attention by the scholars;
particularly its possible influence on audit quality.
Overall, very limited empirical work has been carried
out on joint audits (Ratzinger-Sakel et al., 2013). The
present study significantly contributes in two ways,
it is a response to several calls for qualitative
research on joint audits (e.g., Ratzinger-Sakel et al.,
2013; Holm & Thinggaard, 2014; Holm & Thinggaard,
2016). Second, this study provides a scholarly
comparison of perceptions of Big 4 and small
accounting firms in an emerging economy, where the
accountancy profession is still in its infancy.
Commonly it is perceived that small audit firms
advocate joint audits as they may get an opportunity
to enter the Big 4 firms’ market. Contrary to that, Big
4 firms arguably do not support such a policy.
Present study provides insights into how the joint
audit is perceived by these both sizes of firms.
Findings will significantly help concern
policymakers to improve audit quality, especially
those considering issues related to audits and joint
audits. The current work has been organized as
follows: Section 1 presents concepts regarding audit
quality and joint audit. Section 2 provides audit
market orientation. Section 3 scholarly explains the
methodology adopted in the present paper, and
Section 5 has been dedicated to the findings,
discussion, and conclusion of the present study.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Audit quality and joint audits
A critical review of the earlier relevant studies
revealed that the term “audit quality” can be defined
in a number of ways (Ojala, Niskanen, Collis, &
Pajunen, 2014). Among them, the definition given by
DeAngelo (1981) is most frequently cited in the
literature, which views audit quality as the auditor's
ability to discover and report on material
misstatement. However, a significant delimitation of
this definition is that it only portrays auditing as a
binary process, detection and reporting violations.
Because, previously published papers during the last
fifteen years suggests that the domain of audit
quality is much broader than just simple detection
and reporting of violations (DeFond & Zhang, 2014).
In contemporary scholarly research in the field of
finance (DeFond & Zhang, 2014) audit quality has
been given a key place. As a prime component of
financial reporting, the quality of the audit system
can significantly improve the credibility of financial
reporting. Similarly, according to Alfraih (2016),
audit quality would improve the value relevance of
the financial statement information.
It has been observed that most of the scholarly
research regarding audit quality is guided by
DeAngelo’s (1981), hence the domain of the term
“audit quality” is impaired by significant number of
scholars as discussed by Barghathi, Collison, and
Crawford (2018), external auditors may not report
on material misstatements due to, among other
things, conflict of interest. Further, the concerns
about audit quality persist because of rampant audit
failures and corporate collapse (Kilgore, Harrison, &
Radich, 2014; Quick & Schmidt, 2018) and joint
audits might arguably mitigate this phenomenon.

2.2. Joint audit
In simple terms, a joint audit is a procedure where
two different audit firms (big firm and small firm)
audit a client based on pre-agreed structure and fee.
Hence, the philosophy and opinion of the audit are
shared by respective big and small firm that
ultimately implies that the two audit firms are
sharing the accountability as well (Ratzinger-Sakel
et al., 2013; Holm & Thinggaard, 2016).
Further, Ratzinger-Sakel et al. (2013) stressed that
there is the need for distinguishing joint audits from
the double audit, the latter refers to auditing the
same firm twice; each audit firm independently
performs the work and issue its own opinion.
Similarly, a distinction should be made between
joint audit and dual audit, as in the dual audit each
auditor audits a specific part and provides his/her
opinion on that part.
Although a very insignificant body of scholarly
efforts has been dedicated to examining the nexus
between joint audit and audit quality, mixed results
are shown by the existing literature. The following
section provides a critical review of the selected
scholarly works in chronological order. Zerni et al.
(2012) attempted to scholarly examine the effect of
joint audit on audit quality in the context of Sweden,
an economy where a large number of clients prefers
joint audit. There concludes that joint audits
significantly improve audit quality. Further, they
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stated that in case of a joint audit, the risk is
potentially higher and as a result, each auditor
would be more conservative; one auditor having the
feeling that the other may not perform its audit
share properly. They further added that succumb to
client’s pressure on accounting choices means a
higher degree of independence. However, according
to Zerni et al. (2012) it worth mentioned that joint
audits are associated with higher audit fees.
Thinggaard (2014) claimed that this increase in fee is
justified by the increase in audit quality that is being
provided by joint audits.
Another similar study carried out by Deng et al.
(2014) in France, to investigate the probable
influence of joint audits on audit quality. In France,
it is mandatory for all listed companies, all banks,
and other financial institutions along with any
organization that prepares consolidated financial
statements to appoint two different audit firms. The
audit report is shared by the concern firms who
jointly sign the audit report; for each audit firm is
obligatory to sign the whole report and not just the
portion or work he has performed. Their study
concluded that joint audit adversely influences audit
quality due to the “free-rider problem”; one firm
might invest fewer efforts and resources in its audit
process, perceiving that the other counter partner is
performing it efficiently.
In the context of Nigeria, Okaro, Okaro, and
Ofoegbu (2015) attempted to investigate the impact
of joint audits on audit quality. In their study, they
examined the perceptions of Nigerian accountants,
auditors, and academicians in the field of accounting
and finance. Their findings exposed that in the case
of Nigeria it is perceived that joint audit positively
impacts the audit quality and financial reporting as
the participants stated that "four eyes are better
than two". Although a joint audit is associated with
higher fees, however, the benefits outweigh the
costs, besides, the risk of overfamiliarity with the
client can be mitigated by joint audits.
In the case of French and German listed
companies, Velte and Azibi (2015) found an
insignificant impact of joint audits on audit quality
during 2008-2012. Their findings revealed that joint
audit does not add positively to audit quality and
market concentration both in the case of France and
Germany.
Another similar study carried out by Biscogno
and De Luca (2016) to investigate the effect of joint
audits on the quality of the firm’s financial
statements in the case of Italy. In their work, they
examined the nexus between double audit and the
occurrence of small positive earnings, which could
be attributed to earnings management practices and
a signal of poor earnings quality. They confirmed
that the joint audit system does positively affect
earnings quality and the reliability of firms’ financial
statements.
Considering the existing literature regarding
the nexus between joint audits and audits quality,
there is a need for further investigations (Andre et
al., 2016). In their attempt, they examined the effect
of joint audits on audit fees by comparing the audit
fees paid out in France with those paid by British
and Italian companies; where it is mandatory to
apply joint audit. Prior to the investigation, it was
perceived that fees paid in countries with higher
investor protection (UK) would be greater than

countries with lower investor protection (Italy and
France). Their findings exposed that fees paid out in
France, where joint audits in mandatory, are higher
than those paid in the UK and Italy.
In a recent study, Lesage, Ratzinger-Sakel, and
Kettunen (2017) attempted to explore the
association between audit fees, audit quality, and
joint audits in the context of Denmark. Their
findings exposed that joint audits are associated
with higher fees and no explicit association was
found between joint audits and audit quality. Their
study supports the decision of the Danish
government in which they have abandoned the joint
audit policy since 1930. Most of the literature cited
above refers to European and Scandinavian
countries, which led the EU to raise concerns about
market concentration.
Haak et al. (2018) investigated the possible
impact of the allocation of audit work between
engaged firms on audit quality in the context of
French. Their outcome exposed that imbalance work
allocation enhances audit quality in a joint audit
setting. A logical explanation for this outcome could
lie difficulties in the communications and
coordination process that are usually larger in
balanced joint audit, further, the “free-rider”
phenomenon could also lead to the above outcome;
the free-rider effect will be less.

2.3. Audit market concentration
The concept of market concentration has its roots
back into the negotiations of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) by the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) in 1998. The prime goal of this
agreement was creating a market for accounting and
auditing services through abolishing domestic
regulations that were considered to be restricting
trade and investment. According to Arnold (2005),
GATS applies to all types of services and modes of
delivery that include: cross-border delivery;
commercial presence and staff mobility to highlight
at least three. However, due to the extended nature
of this treaty, it failed to accordingly protect local
accounting firms from the influence of Big 4 who
operate globally (Arnold, 2005; Suddaby, Cooper, &
Greenwood, 2007). Just as claimed by Guo et al.
(2017) the Big 4 audit firms dominate the audit
market for publicly listed companies in most major
economies, for example in the EU, the share market
for Big 4 is about 94%. Although, the expansion of
Big 4 could be welcomed due to their superior audit
quality, however, it is occurring at the expense of
failure to build local capacity that could benefit from
joint audits. Further, according to Kermiche and Piot
(2016), the audit market dominancy by Big 4 firm
has been under the monitoring of some regulatory
bodies, especially after the collapse of Arthur
Anderson in 2002. As some of the scholars suggest
that this concentration could result negatively affect
audit quality (Huang, Chang, & Chiou, 2016).
Potential threats as noted by Kermiche and Piot
(2016) can affect both supply and demand sides of
audit market such as lack of choice on the demand
side and lack of competition on the supply side, and
overall lack of international supervisory oversight.
For example, the European Commission report
(EU, 2011) has also expressed their concern about
audit market concentration by Big 4 firms, as the

34

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 17, Issue 2, Winter 2020

collapse of any of the current Big 4 firms will
adversely affect the entire financial system. Further,
according to Bandyopadhyay, Chen, and Yu (2014)
market domination by a few firms can enable those
firms to significantly influence the regulatory
bodies. It is also accepted that higher market
concentration will significantly reduce clients’ choice
and result in complacency between auditors; audit
fees may increase with decreased audit quality.
Hence, it can be concluded that the existing
literature provides mixed results about the effect of
audit market concentration on audit quality (Huang
et al., 2016).
To overcome the problem of market
concentration, the EU has proposed mandating joint
audit policy. Their suggestion resulted in a
controversial debate and consequently, the EU has
changed its proposal and requires audit firm
rotation after 24 years, however, the EU still
advocates joint audits (Guo et al., 2017).
Policymakers and experts in the field suggest that
the success of EU policy would have resulted in a
significant reduction of autonomy status gained by
the Big 4 through lobbying for the GATS agreement
and might have gone a long way in leveling the
ground between large and small audit firms. It has
been observed that joint audit policy is explicitly
opposed by corporate clients and Big 4, however,
could be more compelling in emerging economies
where the accountancy and audit profession is still
growing. On the other side, the policy is strongly
welcomed by 2nd Tier accounting firms who argued
that joint audit will improve audit quality and
reduce audit market concentration (Guo et al., 2017).
Because the small and medium firms consider that
they will benefit more from joint audits, due to
exposure to new markets and access to the
resources of bigger audit firms. By engaging only
bigger firms, emerging economies may inhibit
poverty reduction by diverting funds paid in audit
and consulting fees to Big 4 firms that are based in
richer nations (Hossain & Sen, 2012).
It has been commonly perceived that Big 4
firms provide higher quality audits (Francis & Yu,
2009; Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, & Zhang, 2011) and
from the client perspective, the audit of the
company by Big 4 firm means company’s
commitment to high-quality financial reporting
(Mokoaleli-Mokoteli & Iatridis, 2017). Factors that
contribute to Big 4 market-dominating position are
the specialization of the audit services, size of the
audited companies, economies of scale, structured
audit methodology, the demand for audit quality,
and the demand of an auditor with a reputation
(Moctezuma & Benau, 2017) and global staff mobility
(Arnold, 2005).
Review of the literature revealed that the nexus
between joint audits, audit quality and audit fees
have largely been examined in the context of
developed economies and very insignificant body of
work explore the experience Middle East countries
such as Kuwait and Libya where joint audits are
mandatory. An attempt by Al‐Hadi, Habib, Al‐
Yahyaee, and Eulaiwi (2017) is an exception to this
situation, where he examined the effect of joint
audit on the cost of debt in the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) region. In their study, they specifically
examined the relationship between joint audits and
the cost of debt for a sample of non-financial listed

firms from GCC and concluded that joint audits
negatively affect the cost of debt. However, they
found that a joint audit increases the credibility of
financial
statements
by
reducing
earning
management practices in companies. The present
study explores the perceptions of shareholders
regarding joint audits in Dubai. The sample city
Dubai has been chosen based on the fact that its
audit market is explicitly dominated by Big 4 firms’
in-addition to the intention of developing and
building the capacity of small audit firms and local
firms. Further, Dubai has been chosen because
financial reports are prepared in the Arabic
language. In recent years Dubai government
embarked on an Emiratization project, and we
postulate that it could, in the long run, be extended
to the accountancy and audit professions. The Dubai
economy is also characterized by family ownership
of enterprises and Islamic Financial Institutions,
therefore, more involvement of the locals through
joint audits may pay-off in the long run as they can
bring
about
this
rich
cultural
contextual
understanding to the audit process.

3. METHODOLOGY
The present study is intended to explore the
perception of different stakeholders regarding
issues related to joint audits, hence based on the
nature of the present study, a qualitative approach
has been adopted for scholarly examination of
perceptions of different stakeholders. Semistructured interviews were conducted for obtaining
more insightful results. According to Nkwi,
Nyamongo, and Ryan (2001), qualitative research
refers to the analysis of data that could not be
assigned ordinal values and the methods that have a
descriptive and/or narrative outcome concerning the
practice or setting (Parkinson & Drislane, 2011).
Considering this, the qualitative approach has been
adopted for a detailed understanding and critical
analysis of the research objectives and to derive a
conclusion. The semi-structured interview had
provided an opportunity for the respondents to
record their true responses openly; the interviewer
had ensured that the interviewee remains on the
topic. To reach the objective of the study, the
following questions have been designed:
RQ1: Do stakeholders think that joint audits can
promote audit quality?
RQ2: Do stakeholders think that market
concentration has any implication on the audit
market?
Being a qualitative study, 12 semi-structured
interviews were conducted; 4 face-to-face and 8
using Google forms. Interviewees were categorized
into 4 categories: Big 4 auditors (BA); 2nd Tier
auditors (SA); Regulators (RG); and Users (US), this
group was mainly composed of academicians.
To compensate for the limitation of the small study
sample, extended and lengthy discussion was
carried out with every respondent. The purposive
sampling procedure was adopted for collecting
desirable data from the study population; the
interviewees were selected on the basis that they
possessed knowledge and experience relevant to
contributing to the research objectives.
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Table 1. Interviewee groups
Type
of organization
Manager
Regulatory
Senior
Regulatory
Member of Board
Regulatory
Partner
Big 4 audit firm
Auditor
Big 4 audit firm
Partner
2nd Tier audit firm
Auditor
2nd Tier audit firm
Auditor
2nd Tier audit firm
Auditor
2nd Tier audit firm
Academic
University
Investor
Private
Preparer
Private
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
Institute of Chartered Accountant of Pakistan
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India

Interviewee
RG1
RG2
RG3
BA1
BA2
SA1
SA2
SA3
SA4
US1
US2
US3
1
The
2
The
3
The
4
The

Position

Years
of experience
Over 15
Over 15
Over 15
Over 15
5-10
Over 15
Over 15
Over 15
Over 15
11-15
Over 15
11-15

Professional
qualification
ICAEW1
CA Pakistan2
CPA
ICAEW
ACCA3
ACCA
CA India4
CA India
ACCA
ACSI
FCA India
CA Pakistan

structure. The quality of the audit is a result of the
performance of the audit team in planning and
executing the audit and the system of quality control
of the audit firm as a whole”.
More particular, being skeptical could enhance
audit quality, BA1, for example, defined audit quality
as follows:
“As auditors, our role is to give assurance to the
stakeholders who are interested in the financial
statements so that they can rely on the financial
statements as being true and fair not materially
misstated. Audit quality to me means that within the
audit we have enough checks and balances to make
sure that we are 99.99999% certain that when we are
signing we can stand behind. So, it starts from the
mindset that you have as an auditor in that you need
to be skeptical”.
It is not surprising to get different opinions for
the stakeholders regarding audit quality (Smith,
2012; Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, &
Velury, 2013; Barghathi et al., 2018) hence, to sumup, it could be concluded that following risk-based
approach
towards
audit
could
result
in
improvements in audit quality. Similarly, compliance
with internationally adopted standards also results
in the enhancement of audit quality.
The second question explores the interviewees’
perceptions regarding the audit quality in the
context of the UAE.
Study participants exposed that the overall
quality of audit in UAE is below the international
benchmark level. A justifiable explanation for this
phenomenon could lie in the presence of Big 4 firms
in UAE, as these firms are providing a higher quality
of audits than small and medium firms. Further, at
the same time, there is a lack of audit regulation for
monitoring, reviewing, and inspection all of which
are resulting in deterioration of audit quality.
Following direct quotations of the study
respondents explicitly highlight these flaws in audit
regulation in the context of UAE.
RG1: “I think it is very variable. I think
generally, the larger audit firms are operating in
accordance with the international standards on
auditing and they have a system of enhanced review
that ensures a certain level of quality. Having said
that, I think there are some audits that are not done
similar to other audits”.
SA1: “Uh, when I compare it… I mean, this is
where I do have the advantage of working in other
markets; audit quality here is not as good as the

4. INTERVIEW FINDINGS
4.1. Audit quality definition and audit quality in the
UAE
Initially, the study participants were asked two
questions, one about the definition of audit quality
and second about their respective perceptions about
audit quality in the UAE. The first question was
intended to explore the opinions of study
participants about the concept of audit quality. The
literature revealed that the term audit quality could
be defined in a number of ways for some it is the
compliance with the professional standards, just as,
RG1 has stated:
“To me, audit quality is giving the right opinion
in accordance with professional standards and
simultaneously ensuring that that opinion is properly
understood by the reader. That is a single definition”.
Another similar definition was provided by
SA4, a 2nd Tier partner, he stated that:
“Consistently and sincerely meeting the
international standards of auditing”.
The procedure followed during the audit
process has also been referred in defining audit
quality, just as pointed out by RG2:
“I think the definition of good audit quality has
two components from my point of view; the first
component is that the opinion is duly supported by
evidence on file. And if you take a step back before
that is the risk of that particular company has been
appropriately identified and then going to an audit
opinion or the evidence, which has been gathered”.
Other study participants have also followed the
same logic such as SA1 and SA3 have provided the
following quotations respectively:
“Audit quality for me depends upon the context;
from a technical context, it is making sure that all the
risks have been correctly identified that could be
present within that audit. And appropriate audit
strategies and mitigations have been put in place to
ensure that these audit risks have been addressed,
that for me is the key pillar in the audit quality”.
“Audit quality means to me a comprehensive
understanding of the key risks that could impact the
financial statements and astutely translating that
understanding into an effective audit plan to address
them. These risks go well beyond the numbers — they
include risks specific to each company’s business,
industry, management team, IT system, and control
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western markets… absolutely no doubt about it. The
western markets are heavily regulated”.
SA3: “Regulation over the audit industry is
under-developed. Hence, there could be potential for
non-adherence to auditing standards though most of
the firms do comply with International Standards on
Auditing”.
SA2: “The quality of audits in the UAE varies
greatly. Particularly, one is able to locate audit firms
who strictly adhere to the Standards on Auditing and
firms who care the least about standards”.
BA2: “In my opinion audit has become more of a
business and less of quality service. This is also driven
by the low level of governance in this part of the
world and also the expectations of organizations
from the auditors. The organizations only expect a
sign on the audit report in the least cost possible and
unfortunately, this is what the audit firms have also
started focusing on”.
Lack of monitoring and follow-ups by concern
government authorities is a prime factor behind the
low quality of audits in UAE, as communicated by
study respondents, such as BA1, has identified the
missing role by the Ministry of Economy to monitor
and review the work of auditors after being licensed.
He indicated:
“I think the biggest challenge is that there is not
any regulation for the audit profession here in the
UAE. So, we get licensed by the Ministry of Economy
and they do a lot before they give us the license in
order to make sure that we have the qualification, the
experience, etc. But then after we get the license, the
Ministry tends to leave us alone, there is no following
up”.
Further, SA4 has also communicated the same
perception that the audit quality in UAE is
significantly low as compared to the economies with
high or tight regulatory systems. However, recently
the UAE government has adopted put in place worldclass regulators such as Dubai Financial Services
Authority (DFSA) and Abu Dhabi Accountability
Authority (AAA). Considering the fact at the present
there is no highly professional and qualified
institute of accountants and auditors that supervises
training locally, it may take long before to achieve
high audit quality, aside from the Big 4. Khalifa
(2012) described the audit regulation in the UAE as
still fragmented, with the government has issued the
Federal Law No.9 of 1975 on organizing accountancy
and auditing, followed by Federal Law No.22 of 1995
– UAE Auditor law. Among the clauses in this law is
allowing non-nationals to practice auditing if they
hold a fellowship from one of the accounting
institutions that are approved by the Ministry.

justification, they communicated some reasons such
as Big 4 firm possess state of the art resources along
with the qualified and trained human capital. Just as
stated by SA11 that Big 4 firms tend to invest heavily
in the human capital (gave them training and equip
them with modern technology) that enable their
professionals to provide higher quality services.
Further, the Big 4 firms get to derive the advantage
from across the countries’ mobility of their staff;
GATS Article V1: 4 clause, a privilege that is not
available to small firms.
Further, the study participant shared that
another justification for the higher quality services
of Big 4 firms, according to RG1, is their broader
network and extended experience in certain
industries. RG1 further shared that though Big 4
provides higher quality services, the 2nd Tier firms
may well have some very good quality within.
However, RG1 only expressed concern about the
audit quality of very small firms. RG1 further
elaborated his case as below:
“If you take a bank for example, with global
branches around the world, very few firms are able
to have the reach to be able to audit robustly an
international bank… Resources are the key. But it is
many things. Firstly, it is the quality of the people
that they recruit the experience that they give to
them because you can’t audit a bank unless you have
already audited a bank and you have experience in
that. It is the remuneration that they give to them to
attract and retain good quality people (again
resources). Having got the resources, it is the
international network. Because you can’t audit a
bank unless you can audit the corresponding banks
with whom they do the business in different
countries. You need to be able to access that
information. Equally, you have to ensure that across
the network there is a consistency of qualities. So,
that if you have an operation in one country, it is
operating as per the international standards rather
than that which is possible in another country
jurisdiction. It is resources; it is reached; it is
expectations, and its skillsets and experience”.
In terms of nexus between audit quality and
firm size, RG2 shared a different opinion, according
to him although there is a general perception that
Big 4 firms provide higher quality audit services,
however, he thinks that the audit quality primarily
dependents upon the partner who is involved in the
audit rather than the firm’s classification. To explain
his case he shared the following:
“I think it is a perception that they provide a
higher or better audit quality. This is my point of
view rather than that of the organization’s that I
work for, I personally believe that it depends on who
is the audit partner (the personality) and it is the
interest of the person”.
However, one could arguably claim that Big 4
firms possess larger resources that enable them to
recruit highly qualified professionals and give them
required training, therefore, partners within Big 4
are perceived to be better qualified and trained.
RG2 added that:
“We can talk about what could be a good quality
enabler and definitely the Big 4 has much better
resources to provide those enabling technology so, if

4.2. Big 4 audit market domination
This section of the paper reviews the perceptions of
the study participants regarding the quality of audit
provided by the two types of accounting firms (Big 4
and non-Big 4). Similarly, the participant’s views
regarding the implication of audit market
domination by the Big 4 accounting firms were also
sought. In this respect, study participants were
initially asked whether they think that Big 4 provides
higher audit quality and why.
The analysis exposed that the majority of the
study participants believed that Big 4 provides a
higher quality of audit services and for the

1

SA1 is currently work for a 2nd Tier, however, he has spent 15 years
working for Big 4 firms during which he has been to a number of training. He
describes that by “I have been extremely well-trained”.
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you have a paper-based audit versus a paperless
audit and have a better software to do the audit, the
chances are that you will not miss the key areas of
audit”.
Further, BA1 also shared that access to and
possession of resources are a prime determinant of
high-quality auditing services of Big 4 firms because
the resources enable them to invest in people, who
is a partner for a Big 4 firm. He further stated that
though Big 4 provides high-quality auditing, non-Big4 (2nd Tier) also provides reasonably good quality
services (but not as higher as Big 4) and that the
concern would only be with those small firms. BA1
defines a small firm as:
“… So, I know within [my firm], if I am doing an
audit here, I am following the same methodology that
I would be following if I was in London and
everywhere else in the world. I think the larger firms
all have that approach. So, I think the audit quality
for most of the bigger firms here is pretty good. I
think the challenge that we have in UAE is when you
go beyond that, when you get to the smaller firms ‘78 people’s firms’ (not the 2nd Tier ones), with one or
two people that have signing rights as partners, some
of them are very good and some that are not very
good”.
On the other hand, some other interviewee had
different views, for example, SA2 referred to audit
failures by Big 4 as an indication to their lower audit
quality, he stated:
“It will not be correct to generalize the
statement. We have seen cases where apparent errors
in financial statements were not reported by even the
Big 4 audit firms. Hence, it cannot be concluded that
Big 4 provides higher audit quality than non-Big 4
firms”.
Further, RG3 shared the opinion that Big 4
firms may deliver high-quality services for big size
firms, however, the situation may differ in case of
small and medium-sized firms, he explained as:
“Not for small and medium-sized companies
operating locally. The audit quality in these
circumstances depends mainly on the partner in
charge of the audit. Yes for large or multinational
companies: the Big 4 generally provide better quality
due to several factors: capacity to assign large
human resources to the audit of a large group;
specialization of audit team in certain sectors like
banking,
insurance,
energy,
manufacturing,
communication, etc.; capacity to audit several
subsidiaries of a group located in different
jurisdictions under the umbrella of the same network
and the coordination of a central team; possibility to
use specialists who can bring their expertise to the
audit team for complex issues like tax, actuarial
matters, IT, review of assumptions and preparation
of business plans; common audit approach used by
any member firm of the network assigned to the
audit; common audit enabling tools embarking new
techniques like audit analytics, visualization, etc.;
more robust system of internal quality control
procedures, including independent review of audit
files prior to issuance of the audit opinion; capacity to
call on risk management team, and other technical
support
teams
for
complex
independence
/audit/accounting issues; greater experience of large
audits and their specificities”.
The benefit that the Big 4 firms derived from
the number of above-mentioned advantages would

apply to certain industries such as banking and
multinational
companies.
However,
study
participants shared that for local companies and
other specific industries the non-Big 4 firms might
provide comparatively better quality auditing
service. Such as according to BA2 the non-Big 4 can
provide higher quality audits, however, due to some
limitations, this may not be achieved. He explained:
“Definitely they can better the quality of audit.
However, because of the low audit fees, this doesn't
enable the audit firms to spend the required time on
the audits in order to provide a high-quality audit.
Also, non-Big 4 audit firms would need to invest in
the advanced audit techniques of the modern era”.
Particularly, the study participants were asked
whether non-Big 4 companies (2nd Tier) have the
capability to provide high-quality audit. The study
participants shared the beliefs that in certain cases
non-Big 4 could provide higher quality audits;
however not just like the quality of Big 4 firms. Such
as RG3 stated that as small firms are operating
locally and are familiar with the local business
environment, he explains this as below:
“Yes for small and medium-sized businesses
operating locally the main factor impacting the audit
quality is the partner leading the audit: the capacity
for this partner in charge to be available and close to
the governance bodies of the audited entity, his
personal professional training, and seniority
/experience are key factors for a quality audit for
companies of that size”.
SA1: “I think they can and in some scenarios
maybe even better quality. For example, the Big 4 got
all the big listed ones that they are dealing with first.
So the other ones that are not part of the FSTE 100 or
S&P 500, they are not getting the same service,
because they are lower down the pecking order”.
RG2 thinks that non-Big 4 are able to provide
good quality audit but there are certain areas and
things that they should be looking at.
He added:
“I, particularly, have sympathy for the 2nd Tier
firms, especially the ones immediately after the Big 4,
because, by branding, people just expect that they
come after the big ones, so they are not Big 4, so they
should be charging fewer fees. They are sitting right
in the middle there. So, where the pricing level is
concerned, people want to associate them with the
smallest firms, as to why they are charging so high in
comparison to the top 10 or top 20. But when it
comes to the audit quality, they are being compared
with the Big 4, like ‘oh you’re immediate Big 5, 6 …
there is a niche market there, where they can provide
a very good quality given a reasonable price”.
A similar opinion was shared by SA1, as there
are some big companies, not enough big to be
chosen by Big 4, they should contact 2nd Tier for
auditing, there they will be treated in a desirable
manner. He further explained:
“For example, a listed company likes Rolls
Royce, because you know that we are going to
pamper you because you are going to be one of our
top clients. But they might be a massive client for us
and they are a very decent size company but they are
a small fly for the Big 4”.
On the other hand, some other interviewees
were of the view that non-Big 4 might be subject to
some limitations, SA2 noted that lack of well-
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qualified staff could deter non-Big 4 from providing
good audit quality, he shared the following:
SA2: “It cannot be generalized. While non-Big 4
have added advantage such as the possibility of
greater client interaction, it may not be always
possible for firms to deliver quality audits. The main
limitations could be factors such as availability of
well-trained staff, access to knowledge resources and
the level of technical support.”
A similar opinion was shared by BA1, as he
stated that possession of comparatively limited
resources by non-Big 4 firm deter them from
providing enhanced quality auditing service;
specifically when it comes to a public company that
would normally be audited by a Big 4. He further
stated that it is a common observation that pubic
companies are being audited by Big 4; this is due to
the perception of the general public that Big 4
provides higher quality audits. BA1 explain his case
as:
BA1: “Well, honestly, when I say non-Big 4, I
mean the 2nd Tier, to make a sensible comparison. I
think the challenge that the middle tier firms have is
that they do not have the resources and the expertise
to do big audits. So, for example, a 2nd Tier firm, if it
was to do the audit of a bank or a large oil company.
They would not have the experience within their
firms of doing those audits. So, if you look at all the
banks in the UAE, they are all audited by Big 4, that
is because there is nobody outside the Big 4 that
would have experience of doing bank audits. So, it
becomes difficult if you haven’t done a particular
industry before, to come in and do an audit first time
round. And a lot of board of directors they would not
appoint a non-Big 4 firm to an audit, because I know,
when we are doing a tender for work, so if a new
client comes in and says we want you to our tender…
one of the things that the board of directors are
looking for is that they want to know, you as [Big 4],
who are your clients in the same industry as us. And
you as [Big 4] the people that you are sending on
your audit team, what experience they have of
auditing other companies in our industry. And this is
where the non-Big 4 firms will have be faced with a
difficulty because the way that the market is at the
moment, Big 4 firms do all the large government
audits, all the large public company audits. It is very
difficult for a non-Big 4 firm to break in because they
do not have the experience so the boards of directors
do not feel comfortable in appointing somebody to do
something if they have not done before”.
BA1: “It is largely because of their experience, it
becomes very difficult for a firm that is not in the Big
4 to be able to grow and to do the bigger clients
because they do not have the experience..., yes,
because large clients will never appoint anybody
other than the Big 4 to do their audit… it is not just
the company themselves, it is like, they will want their
financial statements to may be taken to the bank to
get loans and finances and if you are a public
company in the UAE and you do not have a Big 4
audits, the banks will ask why it is very strange. The
shareholders as well will expect that a public
company will have a Big 4 audit, so you will almost
have to explain why you are not appointing a Big 4
firm, which makes it really difficult for you to go
somewhere else. For smaller companies, private
companies, family companies, they have less of a
challenge; they have the ability to go and appoint a

non-Big 4 firm if they want. I think non-Big 4 can
provide a good quality audit for certain types of
clients.
BA1: “The market perception almost expects
that, for example, if X [a big client] stands up and
says… it is no disrespect to [non-Big 4], but it is just
that the market expectation is that a company like
that would have a Big 4 audit”.
Participants shared the perceptions that
possession of limited resources by non-Big 4 as
compared to Big 4 is the prime reason behind lowquality audit services of non-Big 4 firms. In this
regard, RG1 and US1 respectively shared their
opinion as:
“I think non-Big 4 can provide quality audit. If
they invest, have the right people, if they choose
carefully their market segment and if they do not
stretch themselves too wide. For example, a non-Big 4
firm could not audit a global bank. In fact, even some
of the Big 4 firms struggle to audit a global bank. I do
feel that the 2nd Tier can be a specialist in the hotel
and tourism sector. May be other sectors as well, but
where they specialize in this sector”.
“No, as they might be constrained by financial
and manpower resources”.
The present section concludes that possession
of a huge amount of resources, qualified and
professional team build through human capital
investments, international network, expertise in
certain industries, and public perceptions are the
prime reasons behind high-quality auditing services
of Big 4 firms. The next section presents the
perceptions of participants regarding market
domination.

4.3. Audit market domination
A review of the relevant literature suggests that
around the globe the audit market for the public
listed companies is dominated by Big 4 firms with no
exemption to the UAE. As stated by RG2 that
Big 4 is controlling more than 80% of the UAE
market, he shared this belief when the interviewer
asked him about his concern of the domination by
the Big 4 firms.
RG2: “I wouldn’t answer it with a “Yes” or “No”.
If you look at the numbers, if you look at the UAE
market, the regulated market, the public listed
companies, roughly around 150 or 160 companies,
listed entities on three exchanges in the UAE
predominantly 87% or 88% are audited by the Big 4
firms”.
Similarly, participants admonished while
referring to the fact that Big 4 are dominating the
banking industry.
BA2: “Yes, banks and regulators accept mostly
Big 4 audit firms and that will be difficult to break
through”.
The respondents were further asked about
their concern regarding the implication of Big 4
domination of the audit market. The majority of the
study participants expressed no concern about this;
however, they replied that a more competitive
market will yield more beneficial results.
RG1: “I am not sure if it is a problem as much as
it is less than desirable. It is good to have more
competition. I feel that it would be devastating to
reduce to Big 3. And I think it is healthy to have a Big
5, 6 or 7 something like that. Mainly it is because of
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competition to avoid complacency. Because inbuilt
with complacency is the possibility of audit suffering.”
Similarly,
SA1: “I think it is healthy to kind of have a little
bit less of cartel in place, shall we say. I think the
market will benefit from a better presence and a
better input from more than four. Especially in a
growing economy and market, it will be beneficial… I
think the sector is probably consolidated too much.
Five–to–six seems like a good number.”
BA1: “I think the market share at the moment is
ok, if the number of firms was to become smaller
then it would definitely become a significant
concern.”
From an academic perspective, it seems quite
different, according to US1, the market domination
would seriously affect the economy, he commented:
US1: “Yes, as collectively they enjoy a high
degree of oligopoly.”
The question of why Big 4 are dominating the
audit market was also asked and interviewees have
referred to audit quality drivers for Big 4, which
have been reported earlier, as the reason behind
market domination by Big 4. These can be listed as
resources, network, experience, public perception
(brand name). The following statements further
explain these drivers.
RG2: “Few things actually, one of which is an
investment into technology, which is of particular
interest to all of us that how these technologies would
impact things. Second, investment in people.”
RG1: "It is resources as well as investment. […]
Second point is to do with technology to look at the
audit of the future is going to be significantly
dependent on the technology. The business of the
future will be much focused on technology. We take,
for example, the often talked about the future of the
blockchain, whereby a lot of business, a lot of
individual controls are eliminated because it is taken
over by computerized functions. Now, to audit that,
will take other types of specialists and will take a high
degree of investment in technology to audit and most
firms cannot afford that. Hence, you are going to be
gravitating back again to a Big 4 concept. And
maybe even people talk about firms like Google or
other such technology providers are the auditors of
the future, because they have bigger reach and
ability than even Big 4 has.”
SA2: “The main reasons, in my opinion, are:
benefit from the network; brand names which aid
silent advertisement; acceptability of financial
statements by financial institutions; a presumption by
the general public that audit performed by Big 4 will
be of higher quality compared to other firms.”
RG3: “Several factors can be mentioned:
financial capacity to adapt quickly their internal
organization and methods to a rapid changing world
(for instance embarking data analytics into the audit
approach); financial capacity to develop their size
and nature of services provided to clients notably by
external growth; large and readymade insurance
coverage that allow them to take bigger and riskier
engagements and make the client more confident in
case of any engagement going wrong; worldwide
presence; image and reputation that provide
confidence to the clients.”
US1: “Financial and organizational power
supported with their ability to influence government
and private sector.”

4.4. Joint audit
Technically joint audit is a situation where two
firms, a Big 4 and non-Big 4, jointly audit a company.
They structure the procedures and distribute the fee
on the basis of the agreed procedure. This section
presents the perceptions of study participants
regarding the joint audit, and if applied, would lead
to better audit quality.
For BA2, it is the case that joint audits will
improve the quality of audit basically because of the
notion that four eyes are better than two (Okaro et
al., 2015).
BA2: “Yes, they would, because of another eye
on the work of auditors”.
Other study participants, particularly RG1,
RG2, and BA1 advocated the theory that joint audits
would promote audit quality only if it was properly
brought in. Because, based on their respective
personal experience, joint audit adds little to the
quality as the whole work is being done by the
involved Big 4 firm. They shared their perceptions as
below:
RG1: “I think imperatively one would look at the
French, which I do not know too much about.
Conceptually, I can see and understand the argument
that joint audits might give better quality particularly
the concept of four eyes better than two. But in my
limited experience, where I have been involved in
joint audits I have noticed that there has been a
disparity in the size of the audit firms involved. There
tend to be Big 4 auditors and a non-Big 4 auditor and
no surprise, the Big 4 auditor has more resources and
more experienced and able staff than the non-Big 4.
Then, you use the phrase “free-riding”, I have not
heard that expression but I have experienced the
impact. This is typically what I have seen that the Big
4 found it cheaper and less effort to do the 100%
audit and pay some money to the other auditor for
them to mess about, doing whatever they wish to do.
Rather than proper meticulous planning and
assessment and sharing of the work, whereby there is
clear appointing and so forth. And, I think, this
minimizes their risk (The Big 4’s) or they end up
allocating the work in a way where the areas where
there is insignificant misstatement is allocated to the
non-Big 4. And that does not help anyone very much.
Because the non-Big 4 firm then does not develop any
expertise or learn much and the other aspect that
might be driving this is to do with business
considerations such as PII (Professional Indemnity
Insurance) as you know audit firms in many
jurisdictions are required to have PII, in case there
are claims brought against the firm. There must be
considerations if they are not doing the whole audit
themselves as to the impact it might have either on
premiums or their ability to get cover. Now, in
concept, this can be overcome by the Big 4 firm
reviewing all the work carried out by the non-Big 4
firm and for the actual benefit the non-Big 4 firm
should review all the work of the Big 4 firm because
that is how they will learn. So, conceptually it can be
a good idea. It is achieving two things: better quality;
four eyes better than two and learning and bringing
on and developing non-Big 4 firms if they can gain
the experience. But the practices the pressures of the
commercial world, whereby the company being
audited wants to minimize their audit fees and,
therefore, the work is under pressure to reduce time
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to make sure it is efficient and effective and that has
ramifications for the allocation of the work.”
However,
RG2: “…If It is done well, the auditors should
have integrated planning so there is one planning
and that is shared and there is clear allocation of
audit areas between the firms and those firms
independently and effectively carry out their work
and that work is subject to cross review by the other
firms to make sure that the quality is maintained to
the required standards of each firm.”
BA1: “I think the way that it is currently
structured in loads of countries it does not help. The
Kuwait example makes no difference to audit quality
whatsoever. And I have worked on joint audits here
in UAE, where companies have decided to do it
voluntarily; it has probably raised the level of
assurance from 99.8% to 99.9%. I don’t think it had
made a big difference to audit quality because that
was a situation where two firms were signing the
same report, and we were both working together on
concluding on issues. Again, it made some difference
in that you had a little bit of challenge coming from
your joint auditor but in my experience, the best
approach is the one that you outlined earlier, where
you have two firms to do two independent separate
audits. That would undoubtedly be the best way for
increasing audit quality but the challenge with that is
the huge cost. And it’s not just the cost of having to
pay for the same thing twice, it is also the finance
team, who has to deal with two auditors and that is
going to be incredibly frustrating for many
companies, I would have thought. Yeah, it could
never be completely independent.”
“Yeah, if joint audits were brought in properly,
it could help. It might be a question that you are
going to talk about later on. My perspective on joint
audits is that wherein the Middle East there are
countries where they say that you must have a joint
audit. Kuwait, for example, in practice, what happens
in Kuwait is that the small firm does no work, the Big
4 firm will take a lead on the audit, and the small
firm will not be free-riding necessarily, but it won’t be
driving the work. So, they won’t be taking
responsibility for a particular area of the audit. They
won’t be doing the whole thing; they will be involved
in places. But, to be honest with you, still, the Big 4
firm is doing the audit; the smaller firm is there just
to comply with the law.”
Other interviewees seem to favor joint audits
and do think that such a policy would promote audit
quality, however, in certain circumstances. For
example, if a joint audit was adequately governed.
To SA3, for example, joint audit promotes the
quality, as “Two heads are better than one”. For SA2,
the joint would increase audit quality by reducing
audit risk; it will assist auditors with identifying
material misstatements.
SA2: “Joint audits between Big 4 and non-Big 4
firms could assist better audit quality. While each
firm would be independent they will issue a single
audit report thereby encouraging discussions
between auditors on contagious issues. It would also
increase the possibility of identifying material
misstatements.”
US1: “Yes, as it enhances the levels of
transparency.”
SA4: “Yes if there was a world-class regulator
for the UAE which had the capability to issue

sanctions – for example, a DFSA or ADAA for the
whole country – it would provide a consistent level of
quality for public interest entities where joint audits
could provide a greater level of quality and
transparency for the UAE as a natural hub for the
region.”
RG3, who according to RG2, is a great advocate
of joint audit, shared his perception regarding joint
audit as:
RG3: “Joint audit has several advantages: it
provides a double view on the fairness of the audited
financial statements of a company; may put more
pressure on each of the auditor because the quality
and relevance of the audit work done by one of the
two; should be reviewed by the other professionals;
potentially brings more capacity of human and
technical resources to the audit if necessary; may
avoid having a one-way dialogue with the audit client
(in case of disagreement with the client on audit
issues the view of 2 different professionals from 2
different audit firms is more influential). To work best
the full cooperation between the 2 auditors is crucial:
cross review of work, attendance of the 2 auditors to
each of the important meetings with the client
governance bodies; joint audit may be less efficient
for small audits, for instance for companies not
preparing consolidated accounts.”
This section revealed mixed responses from the
study participants regarding the positive influence
of the joint audit on audit quality. Some of the study
participants shared their belief that joint audits
would increase audit quality simply because of two
heads better than one. Other interestingly shared
their experience with joint audits where, according
to them, most or all of the work is carried out by the
Big 4 firm while the other firm can be a free rider.
The next section presents the implications of the
joint audit.

4.5. Joint audit implications
This section presents the perceptions shared by
study participants regarding the implications of
joint audit policy. Generally, all of the study
participants agreed that the implementation of the
joint audit policy will be associated with a number
of implications. Such as BA1, shared that in addition
to cost, joint audits will bring implications to both
auditors and clients, as both will spend more time
and effort to reach an agreement especially when it
comes to estimation.
BA1: “… But it is going to be very difficult for
clients because they also have their estimates. They
will work within this range and now suddenly their
auditors are coming and saying you have to work
within this range, it is going to be very difficult for
clients, they will feel very restricted by the fact that
they now have two sets of auditors that they have to
keep happy. Not only will that add to the cost and the
time but it will also, I would imagine, be very
frustrating to them. Every decision you make, you
now have two different people to agree to that
decision”.
In terms of reputation, Big 4 may face
implications, because (according to RG1) Big 4 firm
may decide to re-audit the work of non-Big 4 to
ensure the required quality. Further, Big 4 will have
to reconsider the indemnity insurance. In this regard
RG1 shared the following:
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RG1: “Big 4 firm because of its reputational risk,
and because of its professional indemnity insurance,
will attempt to make sure that it covers risks in all
important areas. Now, ideally, there could be a
rotation of audit areas. Now, I think these forces, the
allocation of work, important areas to be given to
non-Big 4, because of the risk to the Big 4 firms they
will put extra effort in assisting and reviewing the
work carried out by the non-Big 4 because they are
exposed from a reputational point of view. So, just
having the joint audits will not solve the issue in my
point of view because some non-Big 4 will be happy to
do nothing and get paid for it. The Big 4 will be
happy to do that; treat it like a tax and just say we
are going to do the whole audit because it is more
cost-effective to do it that way. That achieves
nothing.”
He added:
“What you need to do, is to make sure that the
non-Big 4 firm is fully engaged and to do that, there
must be an expectation to rotate the important audit
areas. Now, one worries here about quality because if
it is inexperienced, i.e., the non-Big 4 firm is doing the
key audit area you can end up with a mess that the
opinion will not be right. The Big 4 firm cannot
professionally allow that to happen, therefore they
will need to invest the time to shadow and review the
work carried out by the non-Big 4 firm, which
hopefully will have the desired results that it will
transfer knowledge, skills, and experience to the nonBig 4 firm, hence enhancing their capability. It will
cover the risk and give a robust audit opinion.
However, it will take additional time and the negative
effect will come in terms of high audit fees. If that
happens, then there will be people cutting corners,
and having a negative effect on quality”.
Similarly, RG2 shared the concern about
consistency between two auditing firms; a potential
implication of joint audit. RG2 explains his concern
as below:
RG2: “I think that the biggest implication would
be a consistency of the audit quality. No two firms
are ever the same; even no two partners in one firm
are the same, so if you put two different partners for
P&L side and balance sheet side although they would
adhere to their companies’ policies, but the style of
their audit is different.”
When answering this question, RG3, explains
how joint audit would be successfully applied.
RG3: “To be successful the joint-audit need a
comprehensive legal and professional framework
applicable locally. This should encompass the
existence of a detailed auditing standard specific to
the organization of an audit between 2 different
auditors (including assessment of audit risks, audit
clarification, share of work, cross review of the audit
work, at least), determination of the legal rules that
should prevail to govern the split of legal and
financial responsibilities between the 2 auditors if the
audit goes wrong, requirements for the 2 joint
auditors to belong to 2 different and independence
audit firms.”
Whatever the implications are, they can be
managed according to SA4, by having proper
regulation in place. He indicated:
SA4: “There are risks with a joint audit but
these can be mitigated by clear regulation”.
While sharing his perceptions, SA2 shared a list
of implications joint audit policy, however, he also

stated that despite all these implications joint audit
policy sill remarkably improve the audit quality.
SA2: “The implications of joint audits could be:
increased audit costs; increased time for performance
of audit; increased management involvement and
interaction with auditors. At the same time it will
benefit in following ways: reduced audit risk; greater
interactions between auditors on contagious issues;
greater professional judgment/skepticism; enhanced
audit quality.”

5. DISCUSSION
The EC Green Paper regarding audit policy and joint
audits serve as a great motivation for the present
paper, however, the case for joint audits in emerging
economies is more compelling. For the last four
decades, the Big 4 firms have been working in the
UAE, and both businesses and government have
been looking forward to them to assist in building
local capacity. Study participants shared the belief
that there is a lack of effective and strong regulatory
system mechanisms in the UAE, which would make
it easier to implement and monitor joint audits.
Khalifa (2012) described the UAE audit regulation as
fragmented, mainly, because it follows practice and
has not been proactive. Further, the UAE AAA
although established in 1997, does not provide
training nor it issues a license to its members;
licenses are still issued by the Ministry of Finance.
Gradually intentional reforms can be carried out,
even if that entails amending schedules to GATS
Article VI: 4 as has been the case with the United
States (US) where licensing of CPAs is done per state
and there is a restriction based on residency rules.
The study participants further mentioned that
joint audit adversely influence audit quality due to
“free-rider problem”; one firm (non-Big 4) might
invest fewer efforts and resources in its own audit
process, perceiving that the other counter partner
(Big 4) is performing it efficiently, as noted by Deng
et al. (2014) and view echoed by interviewee BA1
with reference to Kuwait. It has been recommended
that a prescribed Code of Ethical Conduct by a
recognized body would mitigate any such behavior.
This claim supports the interest of Big 4 firms, yet
market domination does not favor emerging
economies and small firms. Some of the study
respondents shared the belief that joint audits will
channelize funds (in the form of audit fee) from
emerging economies to Big 4 instead of retaining in
their own countries for further economic
development and building capacity. Evidence from
the literature on the increase in audit fees is not
conclusive, the Big 4 still raises more revenue from
non-audit services (MENA Herald, December 18,
2017)2. The current position does not provide scope
for capacity building for the small firm, but an
increase in audit fees for the client.
A theme emerged from the participant
responses that the market should be segregated,
where some industries and specific sectors (such as
hotel/tourism companies) to be allowed to get audits
by non-Big 4 firms. The rationalization for such
proposals emerged from the lack of expertise by
non-Big 4 because international corporations such as
bank and insurance companies required the ability
2

KPMG MESA enjoys strong growth in FY2017 (MENA Herald, 2017,
December 18)
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to procure/use sophisticated technology driven
software to assist with the audit analytics. On the
other hand, it is suggested that Big 4 should train
the owners of small firms because training on audit
procedures does not mean that one will remain with
the firm for a lifetime. Further, some of the former
employees of Big 4 firms possess professional-level
expertise in certain market segments that the Big 4
could assign to them in case of joint audits; this is
not supported by the literature but could be used as
a ploy to preserve market share. The interviewees
also raised an issue of indemnity insurance, which
can be resolved through proportionate liability as is
the case between directors and auditors.
It has been observed that contemporary
globalization tends to benefits western economies
more than the developing and emerging economies
consequent to the institutionalized privileges in
agreements such as GATS. Also, the free trade in
human and technical services benefits the Big 4 and
not vice versa. Other transnational institutions such
as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) should
officially rule out some of the clauses that are not
inclusive. Market domination has been castigated for
unfair practices, leading to anti-trust laws yet the
dominance by Big 4 is condoned or tolerated.
The scholarly review exposes that joint audit
was practiced in economies of continental Europe
such as France and Germany, who have abandoned
the Anglo-Saxon model of audit practice since 1989.
In these two mentioned economies, the audit
profession is supervised by the Ministry of Finance
and also there is a separation between auditing and
accounting; firms that do audits do not prepare
accounts. Further, the European Directive on Audit
qualifications was issued in 1989, thus giving
mutual recognition of accountancy and auditing
qualifications and ultimately resulted in the advent
of Big 4 firms. The current study do not claims that
Big 4 was not present in the continental system
before then, but just to make reference to the
differences in accounting systems and modes of
financing companies; with less dependency on
private equity instead of a bank, creditors, and
family ownership. Consequently, it can be concluded
that joint audits can be easily adapted in countries
that do not have a strong accountancy profession.

failures of audits, both secondary literature, and
empirical studies fail to prove the nexus between
joint audits and audit quality. However, the general
perceptions regarding market concentration are
more telling, supported by wild claims such as “freerider problems”. The perceptions shared by
participants from Big 4 firms were not surprising;
considering the fact that they are cartel and are
entitled to the privilege of international exposer and
can work globally regardless of significant
contextual differences. These privileges are explicitly
entrenched in GATS agreements, which prohibit
countries from restricting trade or investment in
services that include accounting and audit services.
Analysis of the participants’ responses
suggests that joint audits mechanism cannot make it
place on voluntary grounds; developing and
emerging economies will have to use legal regulatory
options. There are some emerging economies where
the accountancy and auditing profession have been
passing through transitional phases. These emerging
economies should be taken seriously even by the
transnational organization, which have great sway
on shaping the outcomes of globalization.
Historically, the inclusive accountancy profession
has continued to affect post-colonial societies.
Considering
the
contextual
socio-economic
differences among countries, conducting large
audits exclusively by Big 4 is not a healthy practice.
Practical implementation of Islamic Economic
theories have been growing globally, which is
introducing new challenges for foreign companies,
joint audits could provide a platform for the
exchange of ideas that could ultimately benefit
clients. The present study strongly urges the
concern authorities and regulators in emerging
economies to focus on local capacity building, one of
which could be joint audits.
Basing the study on the scared available
literature for UAE is a significant delimitation of the
present work. Another delimitation of the present
work is the limited sample size of 12 professionals.
Similarly, the qualitative approach being subjective
in nature can lead to bias and errors. Using Google
online survey is also a delimitation of the present
work; data collected through such a method tends to
be quite short and lacks depth (Saderuddin &
Barghathi, 2017).
Future studies are directed examine how the
regulatory framework for accountancy and auditing
has evolved in the UAE, with a view to co-opting the
Big 4 to be part of the solution to easing audit
market concentration yet upholding audit quality.

6. CONCLUSION
The present study has been carried out with the
intention to explore the perceptions of Big 4 and
non-Big 4 audit firms, investors, and regulators
regarding joint audits. Consequent to the persistent
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